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Faculty and Deans

SMOKE, NOT FIRE
NEAL DEVINS*

One week before the 2004 presidential election, then Chief Justice William Rehnquist disclosed that he underwent a tracheotomy in
connection with a recent diagnosis of thyroid cancer. 1 That announcement left little doubt that the winner of the 2004 election
would reshape the face of the Supreme Court. That announcement,
however, fell on deaf ears. The press gave limited attention to the
story and neither John Kerry nor George Bush used the announcement to focus attention on the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the
announcement about the Chief Justice had no impact on the electorate: exit polls revealed that the Supreme Court was a non-factor in
the presidential election. In one poll, only one percent ofvoters (out
of 569 polled) ranked the Supreme Court as the most important factor in their decision. 2 In another poll, fewer than 0.5% of registered
voters (out of 900 polled) stated that the Supreme Court should be
President Bush's top priority in his second term. 3
Against this backdrop, one would think that Congress sees the
judiciary as a low salience issue-something that does not merit time
or attention. Think again. Over the past five years, the courts have
been the whipping boy of both the left and the right. Liberals have
condemned the Court for engaging in "conservative judicial activism;"
conservatives, among other things, have proposed stripping the courts
of jurisdiction on same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance. 4
What gives? If both sides have bones to pick with the Court, why
not treat the Court as an important election issue? In the pages that
follow, I will provide an explanation of sorts for the di~unction be-

* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and
Mary. Thanks to Laura Mangel and jeff Mead for helping me research this Essay. Thanks
also to Lou Fisher and participants in the Maryland/Geargetown Constitutional Law Schmooze
for comments on a preliminary draft of this Essay.
1. Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States, Press Release Regarding Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist (Oct. 25, 2004), available at http:/ /www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/ press/ pr_1 0-25-04.h tml.
2. Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Moral Values: How
Important? Voters Liked Campaign 2004, but Too Much "Mud-Slinging" 15 (Nov. 11,
2004), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/233.pdf.
3. Fox News/Opinion Dynamics, The Bush Administration, Supreme Court Nominations (Nov. 18, 2004), http:/ /nationaljournal.com/members/polltrack/2004/todays/11/
1119fox.htm.
4. See infra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
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tween lawmaker complaints about the Court and the Court's apparent
irrelevance to the electorate. 5 Specifically, I will argue that conservatives and liberals castigate the Court to secure support from their
base. These attacks, however, are largely rhetorical. Conservatives
and liberals are not upset with the Court. For reasons I will soon detail, the Rehnquist Court typically paid close attention to the signals
sent to it by Congress and the American people. More than that,
lawmakers understand that the aggressive pursuit of court-curbing
measures might come back to haunt them at the polls. Throughout
our nation's history, "median voters" have supported judicial independence.6 Put another way: Rhetorical attacks on the Court serve the
interests of lawmakers by securing their base; heartfelt aggressive attacks against the Court may alienate median voters.

***
It would be wrong to label the Rehnquist Court as either liberal
or conservative. 7 On the one hand, the Court had backed numerous
liberal causes: abortion, 8 affirmative action,9 campaign finance, 10 gay
rights, 11 school prayer, 12 Miranda warnings, 13 constitutional protections for enemy combatants, 14 and free speech on the Internet. 15 On
the other hand, the Court helped hand George Bush the 2000 presi5. No doubt voters are far more interested in the Supreme Court today (Fall 2005)
than they were a year ago. The resignation ofjustice O'Connor, the death of ChiefJustice
Rehnquist, and the Harriet Miers debacle have fueled voter interest in the Supreme Court.
V\Thether or not voter interest in the Court continues, it is nevertheless true that Rehnquist
Court decision making did not provoke voters into thinking that the Supreme Court was
an important electoral issue in 2004.
6. Barry Friedman has written several articles on this topic. E.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MicH. L. REv. 2596 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism]; Barry Friedman, "Things rargotten" in the Debate over judicial
Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 737 (1998).
7. This point is anything but novel. See, e.g., MARK TusHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST CouRT AND THE FuTURE OF CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw (2005); Barry Friedman, The
Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function ofjudicial Review, 72 U. C1N. L. REv. 1257,
1264-66 (2004); William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins ofjudicial Activism, 73
U . CoLO. L. REv. 1217, 1254 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Op-Ed., A Court Not Easy to
Classify, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A31.
8. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
10. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. L ee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
13. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) .
14. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
15. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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dential election. 16 Moreover, its revival of federalism resulted in the
invalidation of legislation regulating firearms, 17 domestic violence, 18
and anti-discrimination measures protecting the aged, 19 the disabled,20 and religious minorities. 21
In making sense of these disparate rulings, I am quite convinced-as Robert Dahl put it in 1957-that the Court's constitutional
decisions "are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States."22 The
Court's 1992 reaffirmation of Roe v. Wadt? 3 is linked to the Senate's
rejection of Robert Bork in 1987 and public support for limited abortion rights; its approval of affirmative action in 2003 seems very much
tied to the fact that elected officials, business interests, and elites
strongly supported race preferences in education; most telling, its revival of federalism can be traced to public and lawmaker support for
devolving power away from Washington, D.C. and to the states. 24
By issuing decisions that match the social and political forces that
beat against it, lawmakers have not been pressured by voters or interest groups to curb the Court. More than that, the American people
have favored judicial independence, especially when Supreme Court
decisions do not upset majoritarian preferences. 25 Perhaps for this
reason, a November 2001 poll revealed that eighty-four percent of
Americans have either "some," "quite a lot," or a "great deal" of confidence in the Supreme Court. 26
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
21. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U .S. 507 (1997).
22. Robert A Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. Pus. L. 279, 285 (1957).
23. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
24. I have spent much of the past five years writing books and articles that make this
point. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & Lou is FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CoNSTITUTION (2004) (arguing that constitutional law is rightly shaped by many forces outside of the judiciary);
Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 63 (2004). On
the issue of federalism, a caveat: I am not arguing that today's Congress never seeks to shift
power away from the states and towards the national government. My point, instead, is
that today's Congress is more willing to embrace states' rights rhetoric and, as such, political conditions favored the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival.
25. See Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2616-29 (discussing
the findings of Gregory A Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 635 (1992), which documented that the public will support the Supreme Court even if it disagrees with particular decisions).
26. Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion, U.S. Public Opinion on the Supreme Court-Confidence in the Supreme Court (Nov. 2001), http: / / www.ropercenter.uconn.edu (search On-
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Against this backdrop, lawmakers understand that there are real
costs in pursuing court-curbing proposals. 27 That does not mean,
however, that lawmakers do not have reason to bad mouth the judiciary. Indeed, the growing ideological divide in Congress creates incentives for both liberals and conservatives to strengthen their base by
engaging in political grandstanding.
Let me explain: Ever since 1980, an ever-growing ideological gap
has separated Democrats and Republicans. In the House of Representatives, for example, the most liberal Republican is more conservative than the most conservative Democrat.28 One outgrowth of this
phenomenon is that lawmakers, especially in the House, are not interested in appealing to centrist voters. In particular, with computerdriven redistricting guaranteeing that Democrats will win certain seats
and Republicans other seats, the party primary often controls who will
win the election. 29 Not surprisingly, lawmakers pay increasing attention to the partisans who vote in the primaries.
In an effort to secure their base, Democrats and Republicans are
increasingly concerned with "message politics," that is, using the legislative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and other constituents.30 Lawmakers, moreover, turn more and more to so-called
"position taking" legislation. "The electoral requirement [of such
measures] is not that [a lawmaker] make pleasing things happen but
that he make pleasing judgmental statements."31 Correspondingly,
even if a judicial ruling barely registers with voters and interest
groups, lawmakers may nevertheless firm up their base by taking a
position on purported judicial overreaching.

line Access to Date, Public Opinion Matters). Fall 2005 polls, however, suggest that there is
declining public support both for the Supreme Court and for judicial independence. See
Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Courl Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006)
(discussing recent polls and their ramifications).
27. See generally john Ferejohn, Independent judges, Dependent judiciary: Explainingjudicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1999) (providing an insightful treatment of the political costs of court curbing).
28. See Keith Poole & Nolan McCarty, 108th House Rank Ordering (Aug. 23, 2005),
http://voteview.com/houl08.htrn (detailing how Republican and Democrat voting patterns were perfectly separated along liberal and conservative tendencies).
29. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics,
46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 415, 427-28 (2004) (arguing that gerrymandered districts eliminate
the importance of the general election).
30. See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CoNGREss REcoNSIDERED 217, 219-26 {Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001) (explaining how parties develop a message that is furthered through both legislative and
electoral strategies) .
31. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (1974).
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Consider, for example, Senate Democrat claims that the Rehnquist Court engaged in "conseiVative judicial activism" and House Republican efforts to prevent "activist" judges from voiding the Pledge of
Allegiance, embracing same-sex marriage, and looking to foreign law
when deciding cases. Rather than express heartfelt disappointment
with Supreme Court decisions, Republicans and Democrats both used
the 'judicial activism" label to solidify their base and, in so doing, distance themselves from each other.
In the wake of the 2000 presidential election (and, with it, Bush v.
Gore), Senate Democrats launched their campaign against conseiVative judicial activism. Senate Democrats called attention to differences between their message and that of the President and his party
by contending-in the words of then Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy-that the Supreme Court was stacked with "ideologically
conseiVative Republican appointees," making the "dominant flavor of
judicial activism . . . right wing."32 Through newspaper editorials,
floor statements, television appearances, and hearings, Senate Democrats advanced a two-pronged message, namely: (1) the Rehnquist
Court's federalism campaign is "conseiVative," "activist," and targeting
civil rights and individual liberties, and (2) Democrats must work hard
to ensure ideological balance on a Supreme Court run amok. 33 "What
we're trying to do," said Senator Charles Schumer, "is set the stage
and make sure that both the White House and the Senate Republicans know [what] we expect." 34
Senate Democrats had good reason to launch this attack on the
Court. By suggesting that their vision of the federal judiciary (a Court
that protects civil and individual rights) is at odds with the Republican
vision, Democrats appealed to their base. More than that, the "conseiVative judicial activism" label served both as a rallying call and a
cover to Democratic efforts to prevent President Bush from appointing conservative judges and Justices. At the same time, there is
little reason to think that Democrats, in fact, were especially disappointed with Supreme Court decisions invalidating federal statutes. A
search of the Congressional Record reveals that lawmakers did not discuss-let alone criticize-these rulings. 35 Likewise, lawmakers did not
32. 147 CoNe. REc. S1671-72 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
33. This and much of the analysis on the Democrats' campaign against conservative
judicial activism is taken from Neal Devins, The rederalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining W'hy Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Courl Decision Making but Not the Rehnquist Courl, 73 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 1307, 1329-30 (2002).
34. Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk; Democrats Readying far judicial Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May
1, 2001, at A19.
35. Devins, supra note 33, at 1311-12.
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openly challenge these rulings through proposed legislation or constitutional amendments. 36 This disjunction between Senate Democrat
claims about the Rehnquist Court and lawmaker responses to Rehnquist Court rulings strongly suggests that the "consexvative judicial activism" label was little more than a rhetorical device.
House Republican efforts in 2004 to strip federal court jurisdiction are cut from a similar cloth. Sponsors of these measures did not
want to enact legislation countermanding the Supreme Court; instead, they wanted to make a symbolic statement. Republican leaders
of the House Judiciary Committee, for example, never bothered to
take a vote on a proposal (sponsored by seventy-four Republicans
from well-established red states and Ohio) to prevent federal courts
from using foreign law. 37 Introduced on March 17, 2004, the committee held a two-hour hearing on March 25th and then let the matter
drop. 38 Likewise, no vote was taken on the Constitution Restoration
Act of 2004, 39 a bill that would have stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction in cases involving federal or state officials' "acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government." 40
Introduced in February 2004, hearings were not held until September
13, 2004 (roughly two weeks before Congress's pre-election recess). 41
House Republicans, moreover, never intended to give the Senate
a chance to vote on legislation that would restrict court power over
same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance. The same-sex marriage bill42 was introduced in October 2003 (one month before the
Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage) 43 but

36. !d. at 1312-14. When enacting legislation responding to these Court rulings,
lawmakers spoke about the need to conform with Supreme Court standards and, in so
doing, treated these decisions as final and authoritative. /d. at 1312-13.
37. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index
(CCH) 34,551 (Dec. 30, 2004).
38. Appropriate Role of rareign judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on
H.R 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2004).
39. H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004); [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index, supra
note 37, at 34,523.
40. H.R. 3799. Sponsors of this measure wanted to register their disapproval of federal
court orders requiring Alabama Chiefjustice Roy Moore to remove a granite monument of
the Ten Commandments that he had installed in the state supreme court rotunda. Sam
Rosenfeld, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPEcr, July 2005, at 24, 24-25.
41. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R 3799 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the judicimy, 108th Cong.
(2004).
42. Marriage Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2003) .
43. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 2003).
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was not voted on until July 22, 200444 (one week after the Senate rejected a proposed constitutional amendment on same-sex marriage).45 Approved by a party-line vote of 233 to 194,46 the bill was
referred to the Senate on September 7, 2004 (less than three weeks
before Congress's pre-election recess). 47 The timing of the Pledge
Protection Act of 200448 is an even more dramatic illustration of
House disinterest in getting the bill to the Senate in time for meaningful Senate considerations. First referred to the House Judiciary Committee in May 2003, 49 no action was taken on the Pledge bill until the
Judiciary Committee ordered it reported on September 15, 2004. 50
That left enough time for the House to vote and approve the bill on
September 23 but not enough time to refer it to the Senate. 51
The timing of the Pledge bill and same-sex marriage bill are certainly suggestive. More significant, unlike nearly all court-stripping
proposals, these bills have little to do with federal court decisions upsetting to lawmakers. True, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
against the Pledge in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 52 but lawmakers waited
(more than two years) for the Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth
Circuit on standing grounds before taking up the bill. 53 More than
that, when dismissing Newdow, three Justices signaled their support for
the Pledge and no Justice suggested that the Ninth Circuit decision
was correct. 54
The same-sex marriage bill is an even clearer example of Congress tackling an issue for symbolic reasons. No federal court had
found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Indeed, no federal
court had invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act, 55 legislation that
44. [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index, supra note 37, at 34,517.
45. See id. at 20,536 (documenting the legislative history of the Federal Marriage
Amendment, SJ. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004)).
46. !d. at 34,517.
47. !d.
48. H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004) .
49. [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index, supra note 37, at 34,508.
50. !d.
51. !d.
52. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) .
53. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312. The Supreme Court issued its Newdow decision on fla g
day, June 14. ld. at 2301.
54. Chiefjustice Rehnquist,joined by justices O'Connor and Thomas, argued that the
Court should have decided the case on its me rits and held that the Pledge of Allegiance
did not violate the Establishment Clause. !d. at 2312. A fourth Justice, Antonin Scalia,
recused himself from the case because he had given a speech defending the constitutionality
of the Pledge. /d. at 2301.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
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would protect state prerogatives over same-sex marriage. And while
the federal courts might someday extend the Supreme Court's recognition of same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas, 5 6 the triggering event
for this proposal was "the demands of four unelected members of
[the] Massachusetts State Supreme Court who have overturned the
laws of the State of Massachusetts and sanctioned same sex marriages. "57 In other words, lawmakers were responding to something
they had absolutely no authority to police.
House Republicans were not dissuaded by such legal niceties.
Their aim was to score points with their base by making judgmental
statements about the sanctity of heterosexual marriage. After all, the
November 2004 elections were weeks away and Republican strategists
had identified same-sex marriage as a linchpin of their efforts to make
moral values the focus of their campaign to reelect the President and
strengthen the GOP's hold over Congress. 58

***
That Democrats and Republicans in Congress see the Court as a
rhetorical whipping boy is hardly surprising. Voters typically see the
judiciary as a low salience issue. Consequently, increasingly ideological lawmakers can play to their increasingly partisan base by condemning "activist" judges (even state judges!). It simply does not matter
that lawmakers are not all that upset with the Court. What matters is
that lawmakers can speak to issues that resonate with their base and,
in so doing, call attention to differences between the two parties.
Ironically, lawmakers might pay a price if they were truly upset
with the Court. Popular support for judicial independence may be
sufficiently strong that the enactment of court-stripping proposals
might prompt a political backlash. The true test of this proposition is
yet to come. As congressional districts become increasingly polarized
and as presidential races turn more and more on the ability of each
side to bring out their base, it may be that the conventional wisdom
about judicial independence will give way to a new era of winner-takesall politics.
56. 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
57. 150 CoNe. REc. H6609 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Weldon of Florida). A second trigger was the unilateral (and subsequently rebuffed) efforts of San Francisco's mayor to recognize same-sex marriage. 150 CoNe. RE.c. at H6583-85 (statement of
Rep. Chabot).
58. SeeSarah Baxter, It's Family Values, Stupid, SuNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 7, 2004, at 15;
Adam Nagoumey, 'Moral Values' Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at A20.

2006]

SMoKE, NoT FIRE

205

In the meantime, the Rehnquist Court will fade from view without testing the willingness of Democrats or Republicans to push
through draconian anti-Court measures. By issuing decisions that
largely reflect majoritarian norms, the Rehnquist Court did not
prompt the true ire of either Democrats or Republicans. For that reason, newspapers, voters, and presidential candidates did not pay much
attention to the Chief Justice's cancer diagnosis and, with it, the
Court.
Put another way: In this era of ideological polarization, it is inevitable that lawmakers will launch rhetorical attacks against the courts.
That Court decisions reflected majoritarian norms is simply beside the
point. But so long as the Court steers a centrist course, ongoing attacks against the judiciary, as the title of this piece suggests, should be
understood as little more than smoke. For those who fear smoke inhalation, the current wave of incendiary anti-Court rhetoric is cause
for concern. Nevertheless, the fires associated with a paradigm shift
of Court-Congress relations are not yet upon us.

